Van Noy
English 307
Spring 2002

Assignment Two

Long before the Exxon Valdez oil spill, there were signs that a serious accident might occur at the Valdez terminal (where the oil is loaded onto ocean tankers) one day and that Alyeska, the consortium of oil companies responsible for managing the Trans-Alaska Pipeline and the Valdez terminal, was not prepared to cope with such an accident.

When the pipeline and terminal began operations in 1977, Alyeska was scrupulous about cleaning up oil; Randy Bayless, who supervised the opening of the terminal for the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC), noted that they would even clean up teaspoon-sized spills that occurred when someone changed a vehicle’s oil on the premises. As the years passed, though, their equipment aged and they became far less vigilant. Dan Lawn, who was responsible for monitoring Alyeska’s operation of the Valdez terminal for the DEC, eventually became one of their harshest critics. He felt they cut corners in order to cut costs and that, by 1983, they lacked the equipment and trained personnel to deal with a serious spill. He also felt that the state wasn’t monitoring Alyeska closely enough.

In 1984, the DEC tested Alyeska’s readiness to respond to an oil spill by simulating a spill of 60 barrels during the loading process (they used oranges instead of oil). The response was supposed to involve hauling out booms to contain the spill and then using skimmers to scoop it into a clean-up barge. According to Lawn and other observers, Alyeska failed the test.

In mid-1984, Lawn wrote a memo to his superiors stating that "We can no longer ignore the routine monitoring of Alyeska unless we no longer care if a major catastrophic event occurs." Just at that time, however, the state of Alaska was experiencing an economic crunch which reduced its budget from $4 billion to less than $2 billion per year. Consequently, state agencies, including the DEC, suffered major budget cuts, and the DEC did not increase monitoring of the terminal. Lawn himself was charged with monitoring not only the terminal, but also sewer systems, restaurants, and landfills.

In 1986, the DEC again tested Alyeska’s spill response capabilities. The observers as a group gave them passing marks, although Lawn was not satisfied with their performance. Lawn began taking a video camera with him on his visits to the Valdez terminal – until Alyeska created a rule forbidding cameras on the premises without permission. George Nelson, president of Alyeska, actually contacted Bill Ross, the Commissioner of the DEC, and asked to have Lawn removed from his position. His argument was that Alyeska and the state of Alaska couldn’t have a good working relationship because of Lawn’s combative attitude. Lawn’s feeling was that the people at Alyeska simply didn’t like him telling the truth.

In 1987, Alyeska was required to submit a new contingency plan for dealing with an oil spill (a plan was required every three years). When the state asked them to include a plan for dealing with a 200,000 barrel spill (the Valdez spill was 250,000 barrels), they refused. According to state law, they were only required to submit a plan for dealing with the most likely spill within a period of 48 hours. They commissioned a study by the consulting firm Woodward Clyde, which determined that the most likely spill would consist of 1000-2000 barrels. The study concluded that a catastrophic spill (such as the Valdez spill) would happen once in 241 years.

Just three months before the Valdez spill, another tanker, the Thompson Pass, sprang a small leak while at the Valdez terminal. The leak was caused by stresses to the ship’s structure from the rough weather in the Gulf of Alaska, also known as "The Mother of Storms." Overall, the ship lost 1700 barrels of oil, and Alyeska responded to clean it up. Lawn felt the response was inadequate, observing that the response team would quit working whenever he wasn’t watching them. In an interview about the spill, he was asked if he thought the Valdez terminal would ever experience a major oil spill event, and he said yes. When asked if he thought Alyeska could handle it, he said no.

Using any of the information above that you find useful, complete one of the following assignments:

1. It’s February, 1989. You have recently started working for the Alaska DEC; you have been hired to replace Lawn, who is being transferred to another part of the state. From talking to Alyeska workers and officials, you have already figured out that Lawn’s combative attitude has made the people at Alyeska unwilling to cooperate with him or with the DEC in general. However, your discussions with Lawn, what you’ve seen of the terminal so far, and your knowledge of the contingency plan have convinced you that his concerns are legitimate – if a major spill occurs in the future, it seems likely that Alyeska would be unprepared to respond to it. You know that Lawn complained about Alyeska on numerous occasions to both Bill Ross, the previous Commissioner of the DEC, and Dennis Kelso, the current Commissioner. Neither of them stepped up monitoring of Alyeska in response. It’s possible Lawn is being transferred because of his attitude towards Alyeska. Write a memo to Kelso that will convince him

• to increase monitoring of Alyeska and
• to work with Alyeska so that they will be willing to include a plan for dealing with a 200,000 barrel spill in their next contingency plan (due in 1990).